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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction by virtue of the 
Appellant's appeal from a judgment entered in Civil Action No. 
8329 in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Millard 
County and the assignment of the case to this court by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in granting 
plaintiff judgment for $14,374.77 for the overpayment on a written 
contract and denying defendant relief on defendant's counterclaim 
for damages for breach of the same contract. 
Appellant makes two points, each one apparently asserting 
that the evidence presented did not support the trial court's 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant's "Statement of the Case" contains inaccuracies 
which require plaintiff to make its statement of the case. 
In 1986 the plaintiff, Marco Industrial Supply, Inc. (Marco) 
was in the business of buying scrap material in the United States 
for resale to a company in Taiwan, Chog Din Snt. Co., L.T.D. 
In September of 1986, Marco's representative, Marc Chien, 
(Chien) learned that the defendant, Richard M. Swain, (Swain), a 
Utah resident, had been the successful bidder for a quantity of 
salvage metal which was located at a United States' facility, the 
Mercury Test Site, in the State of Nevada. (Tr. 5). 
A meeting was arranged at Las Vegas, Nevada at which meeting 
Chien observed samples furnished by Swain of the kinds of 
materials located at the Test Site. (Tr. 6). 
Later, on September 8, 1986, Chien travelled to Fillmore to 
visit Swain's yard. 
While at Swain's yard, Chien inspected salvage material and 
signed a handwritten agreement prepared by Swain which affected 
materials at the Nevada Test Site and materials at Swain's yard 
near Fillmore. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Tr. 14). 
The terms of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 provided that Marco would 
purchase approximately 750,000 pounds of 
"aluminum coaxial and copper located at Mercury Test 
Site $.21 per pound delivered to Long Beach. Also 
included is material at Swain's property in Utah." 
The writing, Exhibit A, listed types of salvage located at 
Swain's yard, fixed the prices for each type of material but did 
not describe a quantity to be purchased. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1). 
Materials were purchased by Marco and were shipped from 
Nevada and Utah to Tawain in large metal containers which were 
about 40 feet in length. By October 28, 29 containers had been 
shipped. Twenty-four were shipped from Nevada, five from 
Fillmore. The 25 containers shipped from Nevada contained 
materials which totaled 737,000 pounds. Marco paid Swain when 
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Marco was advised by telephone by Swain that the materials had 
been shipped. A total of $210,052.00 was paid which exceeded by 
$14,374.77 the agreed prices of the material delivered. The fact 
of the overpayment was not disputed. (Tr. 100). 
Chien testified that when the shipped materials arrived in 
Taiwan they were not as had been agreed. He testified that 30 to 
40 percent of the materials were not as agreed. (Tr. 18). As 
recited above, the materials had been paid for when Swain gave 
notice that they had been shipped. (Tr. 14, 15). Marco notified 
Swain of the claimed discrepancy between the goods purchased and 
those received. Two meetings were held at Las Vegas to attempt to 
negotiate a settlement over the claimed deficiency. The 
settlement negotiations were unsuccessful. Marco then sued to 
recover its excess payments and Swain counterclaimed claiming 
damages for the breach by Marco of the terms of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1. 
The essence of Swain's appeal is two-fold. The first claim 
is that Marco agreed to purchase all of the materials of the kinds 
listed on Exhibit 1 which were located at the Fillmore yard and 
did not do so. The second claim is that Marco agreed to purchase 
all of the materials which Swain had purchased at the Mercury Test 
Site and that Marco did not do so. Swain claims that the figure 
750,000 was intended as an approximation of all the materials at 
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the Test Site which Swain claims Marco had agreed to purchase, not 
an approximate amount of material which Marco was required to 
purchase. The trial court found that the written agreement 
(plaintiff's Exhibit 1) was written by Swain and should be most 
strongly construed against him. The court held that Marco was not 
obligated to take more materials than it had purchased. The court 
further held that Swain's evidence did not establish that he, 
Swain, had been damaged. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT 
THERE WAS NO INDENTIPICATION TO THE CONTRACT OF ANY 
GIVEN QUANTITY OF MATERIALS OF THE FILLMORE YARD 
In Swain's "Summary of Argument", paragraph 1 at page 6 of 
his brief, he makes two claims. The first is that 
Marco did not take all the material he agreed to take; and 
where Swain presented competent evidence showing he suffered 
damages far in excess of the advance payment, which evidence 
was not disputed in any manner by Marco. 
Both of those statements are incorrect. Only two witnesses 
were called. On the critical issues the trial court chose to 
believe Chien rather than Swain. 
The trial court held in Finding of Fact Number 6 that Marco 
did not agree to purchase all of the material at Swain's yard: 
No quantity of material at the Utah site was ever 
specified, but plaintiff estimated the pile of scrap viewed 
by the parties contained approximately 5 containers; 
defendant estimates that such pile contained 12 to 14 
containers. 
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(Record 100, 107). 
A glance at Exhibit 1 will confirm that it does not specify a 
quantity. The contract, plaintiff's Exhibit 1, was written by 
Swain. The court ruled that its terms should be construed against 
him and in favor of Marco. The contract did not specify a 
quantity and the trial court was not persuaded that Marco had 
agreed to purchase all material located at Swain's yard. 
In Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 492 P.Id 132, 27 
Utah 2d (1971) the court stated: 
Where appellant's position is that trial court erred in 
refusing to make certain findings essential to its right to 
recover, and it insists that the evidence compels such 
findings, it is obligated to show that there is credible and 
uncontradicted evidence which proves those contended facts 
with such certainty that all reasonable minds must so find; 
conversely if there is any reasonable basis, either in the 
evidence or from the lack of evidence, upon which reasonable 
minds might conclude that they are not so convinced by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then the findings should not 
be overturned. 
To the same effect is Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 
1974): 
Actions of trial court are indulged with a presumption of 
validity, and burden is upon appellant to prove such serious 
inequity as to manifest clear abuse of discretion. 
See also R. C. Tolman Const. Co., Inc. v. Myton Water Assn., 
563 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976) and Leon Glazier & Sons, Inc. v. Larsen, 
491 P.2d 226, 26 Utah 2d 429 (1971). 
See also Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988), 
where the court stated: "When examining court's findings of fact, 
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reviewing court defers to those findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous." 
At page 100 of the transcript, Chien testified that on 
September 8, 1986 he estimated that Swain's yard contained about 
five containers of materials, Swain testified that the yard 
contained between 12 and 14 containers of material. (Tr. 107). 
No evidence was presented with respect to any inventory records as 
of September, 1986. No business records were produced which would 
have enabled the trial court to find the quantity of material 
located at Swain's yard on September 8. 1986. The only evidence 
was the estimate of Swain and the estimate of Chien. In addition 
to the fact that there was no competent evidence as to the 
quantity of material present in September, the court properly 
found the plaintiff's Exhibit 1 did not specify any quantity of 
goods to be purchased. 
POINT II 
MARCO SATISFIED THE QUANTITY REQUIREMENT OF THE 
CONTRACT. 
The trial court held that since plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was 
written by Swain that it should be construed against Swain and in 
favor of Marco. (Conclusions of Law No. 1, Record 119). 
The purchase of 737,000 pounds of materials satisfied Marco's 
obligation to purchase approximately 750,000 pounds of goods. 
Marco purchased more than 98% of the quantity of aluminum and 
copper coaxial cable specified by plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
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The court's finding that the purchase of 737,000 pounds 
satisfied the contract requirement is well supported by the 
authorities. 
The case of Holland v. Rea, 43 Mich. 218, 12 N.W. 167 (1982) 
held that delivery of 473,000 of an agreed 500,000 feet of logs 
amounted to substantial performance. See also, in Polhemer v. 
Herman, 45 Cal. 573 (1873), a delivery of 47,315 pounds of wool 
was held a sufficient compliance with a contract requiring the 
delivery of "about" 53,000 pounds. In this case, Marco purchased 
737,000 out of 750,000 pounds specified. Certainly purchase of 
.9816% of approximately 750,000 represents compliance with the 
contract terms. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT SWAIN DID NOT SUPPORT 
HIS DAMAGES CLAIM BY A PREPONDERANCE OF CREDIBLE 
EVIDENCE. 
At trial, Swain did not produce any records showing the 
amount of goods he had in inventory on hand at any time. He 
produced no written records to show purchases of goods, no records 
of quantities of inventory on hand at any particular time nor any 
records of sales. 
It appears that Swain operated his business strictly on a 
cash basis and kept no written records reflecting his business 
activities. There wasn't any evidence other than Swain's oral 
testimony to support Swain's claim as to the quantity of goods 
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located at the Mercury Test Site nor at Fillmore or whether the 
material had been sold, and if sold, at what price. 
Swain sought to prove his damages solely by oral testimony 
regarding the quantities and kinds of goods not purchased by 
Marco. He sought to testify about the sales price and the 
quantities of each kind of goods sold. 
At the trial, Judge Christensen sustained objections to 
Swain's oral testimony as to the quantities of materials sold by 
Swain which Swain agreed that Marco had agreed to purchase. The 
court also denied admission to Swain's testimony concerning the 
sales price of the materials which Swain said that Marco did not 
purchase. When Swain sought to testify, counsel for plaintiff 
objected that the offerred testimony was not the best evidence. 
The objection was sustained. (Tr. 135). 
A better objection would have been that the evidence was not 
relevant by reason of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The court was concerned (Tr. 135) that Swain sought to prove 
his damages by his oral testimony and that he did not offer any 
business records or other evidence to support his parol 
testimony. The court referred to figures being pulled out of the 
air to support Swain's claim. (Tr. 135) The court was not 
satisfied with Swain's testimony concerning Swain's claimed 
damages absent any business records to support his testimony. 
At Swain's request, the judge granted Swain a five day period 
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to supplement the record with written records evidencing the 
quantities and prices of sales to which Swain testified. (Tr. 
140). No such records were ever produced. Instead, Swain offered 
an affidavit and a hand written summary saying essentially the 
same things to which he had testified at trial. (R. 21-25). No 
business records were produced. 
The only evidence furnished by Swain as to the quantities, 
kinds of goods or prices at which the salvage materials were sold 
was his parol testimony and an affidavit signed by him. No 
supporting documentary evidence of any kind was furnished. In the 
absence of any written evidence of records of purchase, sale or 
ownership of the goods to which Swain testified, it was clearly 
within the discretion of the court to find that the evidence 
offered in support of Swain's claim did not satisfy his burden of 
proof. 
CONCLUSION 
On disputed evidence, the trial court found that plaintiff 
was entitled to judgment for the sum of $14,374.77 by reason of an 
undisputed payment for goods not received. 
On disputed evidence the court found that defendant and 
counterclaimant had not proved breach of contract nor damages. 
The record shows credible competent evidence to support the 
trial court's findings, and a lack of credible evidence to support 
defendant's defense or his counterclaim. 
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The trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
Dated this /, day of April, 1989. 
/ / A W&* 
DALLAS H. Y O J J N G / 
IVIE & YOUNG / 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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